Locke on Toleration

John Locke wrote four letters concerning toleration in his lifetime. The most famous of these was the Epistola de Tolerantia (Letter Concerning Toleration), written in 1685; Locke wrote the letter to his friend Philip von Limborch.[1] This letter is the most general of all four letters concerning toleration. Locke’s understanding of toleration can be summed up as follows: every person ought to be permitted to worship as their conscience dictates; the government may not make laws requiring religious attendance at a state specified Church; but that does not mean the government may not promote religion through persuasion as every other citizen is permitted.

            There are found topics concerning toleration discussed throughout the first letter. The first is toleration as the characteristic of the True Church.[2] Secondly, Locke discusses the role of the government in religion. He then discusses the Church, defining it and describing the powers granted unto it. Locke then discusses the bounds placed on religion by toleration and then the bounds placed on the society by toleration

            “That I esteem that Toleration to be the chief Characteristical Mark of the True Church.” [3] Locke asserts that the toleration is above all the duty of a Christian as given to humanity by Christ. Christians must first concern themselves with their own salvation before they can assume to tell others about salvation.[4] In order for someone to be saved, they must sincerely believe in Christ as their savior. This notion dictates that forcing someone to worship in a manner contrary to their own consciousness would in fact futile to the desired end.[5] Locke asserts, “The Toleration of those that differ from others in Matters of Religion, is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine Reason of Mankind, that it seems monstrous for Men to be so blind, as not to perceive the Necessity and Advantage of it, in so clear a Light.”[6] A Christian must not punish those who do not believe in the same faith.

            As having asserted that toleration is the chief characteristic of the True Church, Locke demonstrates the boundaries of Civil Government from that of Religion[7]. Locke begins his discussion of Civil Government and Religion by saying, “The Commonwealth seems to me to be a Society of Men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own Civil Interests.” [8] He labels the “Civil Interests” to be, “Life, Liberty, Health, and Idolency of Body; and the Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture and the like.”[9] The duty of the sovereign is procure these goods and other goods necessary for this life. Thus it is inherently not the duty of the magistrate to legislate religion for the salvation of the soul.[10] The authority of salvation of souls is not granted to the magistrate by God, nor can it be granted to the magistrate by the People. Locke explains:

Nor can any such Power be vested in the Magistrate by the consent of the People; because no man can be so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether Prince or Subject, to prescribe to him what Faith or Worship he shall embrace. [11]

 

The power of salvation must lie in the hands of the individual citizen for his or her own salvation, because as Locke describes, “All the Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full perswasion of the mind; and Faith is not Faith without believing.”[12]

Secondly, the magistrate creates laws that have punishments when the law is not followed, thus to create laws dictating religion would place punishment on those who do not follow the law; further it would coerce individuals to follow the state religion against their own consciousness. [13] While the magistrate is not permitted to create laws concerning religion, Locke does say:

It may indeed be alledged, that the Magistrate may make use of Arguments, and thereby draw the Heterodox into the way of Truth, and procure their Salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other Men. In teaching, instructing, and redressing the Erroneous by Reason, he may certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy does not oblige him to put off either Humanity or Christianity. But it is one thing to perswade, another to command; one thing to press with Arguments, another with Penalties. This Civil Power alone has a right to do; to the other Good-will is Authority enough. Every Man has Commission to admonish, exhort, convince another of Error and by reasoning to draw him into Truth; but to give Laws, receive Obedience, and compel with the Sword, belongs to none by the Magistrate. [14]

 

This is the sum of the authority of the magistrate in matters of religion, which he receives by virtue of his humanity.

            In the third place, Locke argues that the magistrate cannot involve himself in religion because there is only one way to Heaven. Since no one knows what the true religion is, forcing someone to obey a state religion could mean the damnation of that person’s soul. [15]

            Moving on, Locke defines a church as:

A Church then I take to be a voluntary Society of Men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the publick worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the Salvation of their Souls.[16]

A person must come to religion on their own accord; no one is born a member of a church as a result. [17]re can be no state mandated religion or Church as a result. The church, as a voluntary society, must be permitted to create laws that all members consent to in order to survive. These laws consist of the following:

  • “Place and time of meeting…”
  • “Rules for admitting and excluding Members…”
  • Distinction of Officers and putting things into a regular Course, and such like…”[18]

Like the Civil Society, a Church cannot punish a member save removing them from the Church.[19] Churches must have a ruler established and consented to by the members of the Church. And as in Civil Society, Locke argues that no man can be forced to belong to a Church without consenting to his representatives. [20]

            This thus ends the argument concerning what the Civil Society and Church are permitted to do. Locke then discusses toleration in regards to both Civil Society and Church. The Church is bound by toleration, first, by removing any person from the communion of the Church after continuing to disobey the Laws of the Society. [21] is it that a Church may remove a member? Locke responds, “For these being the Condition of Communion, and the Bound of the Society, if the Breach of them were permitted without any Animadversion, the Society would immediately be thereby dissolved.”[22]

            Private Citizens are bound by Toleration as well, Locke states, “nor ought any private Persons, at any time, to use Force; unless it be in self-defence against unjust Violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated Person of any of those Civil Gods that he formerly possessed.”[23]the same manner the private citizens is not permitted use prejudice against any person based on his or her religious beliefs. [24]

            When the Magistrate joins himself with a specific church and religion he does not grant any new rights to the church or religion that they did not already possess; in the same light the church or religion does not grant any new authority the Magistrate. [25] right of a society to remove members that disobey the laws that were consented to cannot be denied according to Locke; however the church society does not have a right to acquire any new rights over those that are not members.[26]Churches are bound to toleration in these manners, that they may create laws and a ruling body based on the consent of their members, also that they may remove those members but may not infringe on their life, liberty or property, and finally that they are not permitted to exercise any authority over persons not members of the church society.

            Locke finishes his letter with a discussion of how the Civil Society is bound to toleration. [27] Locke has already established that the magistrate does not have the authority to create laws requiring individuals to attend a specific church, worship in a specific manner and believe in a specific deity. He reiterates this by saying, “Not a Magisterial Care, I mean, which consists in prescribing by Laws, and compelling by Punishments. But a charitable Care, which consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading, cannot be denied unto any man.”[28] Laws can be created for the protection of goods and health of the members of the society.[29] He sets out to discredit the belief that the magistrate can dictate the religious beliefs of the society through laws. The question is finally asked by Locke, “If the Religion of any Church become therefore true and saving, because the Head of that Sect, the Prelates and Priests, and those of Tribe, do all of them, with all their might, extol and praise it; what Religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false and destructive?”[30] Another problem with the magistrates dictating religion is that when one magistrate dies and another takes his place the beliefs of the religion might be changed. He points to the reformation monarchs of England and demonstrates how the religious beliefs of the national church changed as each monarch ascended to the throne. Thus Locke asserts:       

I may grow rich by an Art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some Disease by Remedy that I have not Faith in; but I cannot be saved by a Religion that I distrust, and by a Worship I abhor. It is in vain for an Unbeliever to take up the outward shew of another mans Profession. Faith only, and inward Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God.

 

            From this Locke discusses toleration on two levels, the outward worship of the religious society and the inward worship. In regards to the outward worship, Locke believes that the magistrate has no authority in prescribing the manner of worship through law. This power is held away from the magistrate because the church is a free society, permitted to create its own rules concerning the outward worship of its members.[31] Law may only be created with the ends of the public good in mind, not with the salvation of individual souls, which is the responsibility of the individual person. Locke does permit the magistrate’s interference into religion when the ceremonies used by the church endanger the life, liberty or property of the members. [32] The magistrate has authority as well, if it prove to be beneficial to the society, to order aspects of the outward worship be practiced by the society; Locke uses the example of infant baptism, that if it proves to protect against disease then the magistrate has authority to order all infants to be washed.[33] Locke once again proposes that, “Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the Magistrate in the Church.”[34] For example, if it is legal for a man to slaughter a chicken in his home then he must be allowed to slaughter a chicken for sacrifice in church. Laws that are passed to prohibit a religious sect from performing an outward symbol of worship must be general and political. That is to say that the law must apply to all citizens for the specific purpose of the public good.[35]

            After discussing the manner of outward worship, Locke moves to the inward worship of religions. He separates inward worship into two categories: the speculative opinions and practical articles of faith. As to the speculative opinions, the magistrate is not permitted to forbid the preaching or profession of such opinions. For example, a Roman Catholic should be allowed to believe the bread and wine becomes the body and blood of Jesus Christ; the Jew should be allowed to believe the New Testament to be false. [36]

            As for the practical Locke begins by saying:

A Good Life, in which consists not the least part of Religion and true Piety, concerns also the Civil Government: and in it lies the safety both of Mens Souls, and of the Commonwealth. Moral Actions belong therefore to the Jurisdiction of both the outward and inward Court; both of the Civil and Domestick Governor; I mean, both of the Magistrate and Conscience.

 

The religious beliefs of the individual must not infringe on the rights of another man. The beliefs of a religion cannot be contrary to the public good as dictated by the law. All persons are obligated to follow the law when it is for the public good; but one may also go against the law if it is not for the public good. The commonwealth’s authority extends only to those things of this life, not of the afterlife; thus they may not legislate laws that protect the interests of persons in this life. [37] A religion cannot profess that its members assume the mantle of responsibility that is already granted to the commonwealth. That is to say, the responsibility of the religion is to help in the salvation of the souls of its members; the religion may not profess to have any control over the public good.

            At this point Locke engages a discussion of instances when the magistrate is no longer bound to tolerate a specific religious sect:  

No Opinions contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are necessary to the preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate. But of these indeed Examples in any Church are rare. For no Sect can easily arrive to such a degree of madness, as that it should think fit to teach, for Doctrines of Religion, such things as manifestly undermine the Foundations of Society, and are therefore condemned by the Judgment of all Mankind: because their own Interest, Peace, Reputation, every Thing, would be thereby endangered.[38]

 

There is an inherent obligation of religion to teach its members to obey the laws of the commonwealth. If the religion teaches something contrary to the public good, the magistrate has an obligation not to tolerate it. The religion may also not profess authority to relieve members of allegiance to the prince of the commonwealth.[39] Locke says, “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the Magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves up to the Protection and Service of another Prince.”[40] Finally Locke lists another set of person that should not to be tolerated by the magistrate:

Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold upon an Atheist. The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all. Besides also, those that by their Atheism undermine and destroy all Religion, can have no pretence of Religion whereupon to challenge the Privilege of a Toleration. As for other Practical Opinions, tho not absolutely free from all Error, if they do not tend to establish Domination over others, or Civil Impunity to the Church in which they are taught, there can be no Reason why they should be tolerated. [41]

In the end, Locke sums up his beliefs of who is to be tolerated and who is not to be tolerated:

Those that are Seditious, Murderers, Thieves, Robbers, Adulterers, Slanders, etc. of whatsoever Church, whether National or not, ought to be punished and suppressed. But those whose Doctrine is peaceable, and whose Manners are pure and blameless, ought to be upon equal Terms with their Fellow-Subjects.

           

            Locke’s understanding of toleration extends to both the commonwealth and the church. Religions must obey laws established for the public good, while in the same light the commonwealth may not pass laws specifically prohibiting a certain religion from doing something allowed to other citizens. Religions have the same rights granted to them that any other private association would have. Persons are required to believe in some sort of deity, and those that act contrary to the public good are not to be tolerated at all. For Locke the idea of toleration is at times simple but can become very complex at the same time. Religion has no right to involve itself in the public affairs, while the commonwealth may involve itself in private affairs when those affairs act contrary to the public good.

Footnotes


 [1]Introduction of Letter Concerning Toleration by John H. Tully

 [2]LCT. Pg 23. in Tully

 [3]LCT. Pg. 23 in Tully

 [4]“It would indeed be very hard for one that appears careless about his own Salvation, to persuade me that he were extreamly concern’d for mine.”- LCT. Pg. 23 in Tully

 [5]Desired end of Christian salvation is to be saved, however one cannot be saved if they do not sincerely believe in Christ.

 [6]LCT. Pg. 25 in Tully

 [7]“I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie between the one and the other.”- LCT, pg. 26 in Tully.

 [8]LCT. Pg. 26 in Tully

 [9]LCT. Pg. 26 in Tully

 [10]“Now that the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to these Civil Concernments; and that all Civil Power, Right and Dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the Salvation of Souls..” LCT, pg. 26 in Tully.

 [11]LCT pg. 26 in Tully

 [12]LCT. Pg 26 in Tully

 [13]“The care of Souls cannot belong to the Civil Magistrate, because his Power consists only in outward force; but true and saving Religion consists in the inward perswasion of the Mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God.”- LCT Pg. 27 in Tully

 [14]LCT. Pg 27 in Tully; cross reference with page 35 “In the last place..”

 [15]“For there being but one Truth, one way to Heaven; what Hopes is there that more Men would bed led into it, if they had no Rule but the Religion of the Court, and were put under a necessity to quite the Light of their own Consciences, and blindly to resign up themselves to the Will of their Governors…” LCT, Pg 27

 [16]LCT, pg 28 in Tully

 [17]“No Man by nature is bound unto any particular Church or Sect, but ever one joins himself voluntarily to that Society to which he believes he has found that Profession and Worship which is truly acceptable to God.”- LCT, pg. 28 in Tully

 [18]LCT, pg. 28 in Tully

 [19]LCT pg. 30 in Tully

 [20]LCT, Pg. 29 in Tully

 [21]“That no Church is bound by the Duty of Toleration to retain any such Person in her Bosom, as, after Admonition, continues obstinately to offend against the Laws of the Society.”- LCT, Pg. 30 in Tully

 [22]LCT Pg. 30 in Tully

 [23]LCT Pg. 31 in Tully

 [24]“No private Person has any Right, in any manner, to prejudice another Person in his Civil Enjoyments, because he is of another Church or Religion”- LCT Pg. 31 in Tully

[25]“For the Civil Government can give no new Right to the Church, nor the Church to the Civil Government.”- LCT Pg. 31 in Tully

 [26]“This is the fundamental and immutable Right of a spontaneous Society, that it has power to remove any of its Members who transgress the Rules of its Institution: But it cannot, by the accession of any new Members, acquire any Right of Jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it.”- LCT pg. 31 in Tully

 [27]“Let us now consider what is the Magistrate’s Duty in the Business of Toleration: which certainly is very considerable.”- LCT pg. 35 in Tully.

 [28]LCT pg. 35 in Tully

 [29]“Laws provide, as much as is possible, that the Goods and Health of Subjects be not injured by the Fraud or Violence of others…”-LCT pg. 35 in Tully.

 [30]LCT pg 37 in Tully

 [31]“that the Magistrate has no Power to enforce by Law, either in his own Church, or much less in another, the use of any Rites or Ceremonies whatsoever in the Worship of God. And this, not only because these Churches are free Societies, but because whatsoever is practiced in the Worship of God, is only so far justifiable as it is believed by those that practice it to be acceptable unto him.”- LCT pg. 39 in Tully

 [32]“The only business of the Church is the Salvation of Souls: and it no ways concerns the Common-wealth, or any Member of it, that this, or the other Ceremony be there made use of. Neither the Use, nor the Omission of any Ceremoney in those Religious Assemblies, does either advantage or prejudice the Life, Liberty or Estate of any man.”- LCT pg. 39 in Tully

 [33]“Let it be granted also, that if the Magistrate understand such washing to be profitable to curing or preventing any Disease that Children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a Law, in that case he may order it to be done.”- LCT pg. 40 in Tully

 [34]LCT pg. 42 in Tully

 [35]“The Magistrate ought not to forbid the Preaching and Profession of any Speculative Opinions in any Church, because they have no manner of relation to the Civil Rights of the Subjects. If a Roman Catholick believe that to be really the Body of Christ, which another man calls Bread, he does no injury thereby to his Neighbour. If a Jew do not believe the New Testament to be the Word of God, he does not thereby alter any thing in mens Civil Rights.”- LCT pg. 46 in Tully

 [36]“For the Political Society is instituted for no other end but only to secure every mans Possession of the things of this life.”- LCT pg. 48 in Tully.

 [37]LCT pg. 49 in Tully

 [38]LCT pg. 50 in Tully

 [39]LCT pg. 51 in Tully

Endnotes


 [40]For modern example of this principle see Church of Lukumi Babalu Ave., Inc. v. Hileah. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). Supreme Court ruled a law passed by the Hileah to be unconstitutional because it barred the Lukumi from practicing sacrifice despite not outlawing slaughtering in general.

[41]Locke was aware of the fact that the Roman Catholic Church was already in the process of changing her views on this subject.

Published in: on March 31, 2008 at 01:33  Comments (2)  

Battle in New York: The Question of the Federal Judiciary

 A simple observation of the Federal court system would beg the question whether our courts are a mere mechanism of the giant leviathan of present-day government, or whether the courts have remained unaffected by changes in government. From the fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788 a battle was waged in New York between two factions: the Federalist and the Anti-Federalist. The Federalists were led by the magnanimous Publius and the Anti-Federalists were led by Brutus. Their discussions on the Federal judiciary are the most important carried out between Publius and Brutus. It appears that neither of them had a firm grasp of the Federal judiciary and the possible outcome of the power granted to this branch of government. Two-hundred years after the discussions were held, in America we are left with what appears to be a corruption of the then proposed Federal judiciary as Brutus predicted, but also a Federal judiciary that Publius in many aspects predicted would develop.

            In order to properly evaluate the arguments made by both Publius and Brutus we must begin our observation from the question of the nature and extent of judicial power and whether it poses any threat to the other two branches. We shall also observe the discussion between Brutus and Publius concerning the other matters in which the Federal judiciary holds authority and their relation to the extent of judicial power.

            What is the nature of the power granted to the Federal judiciary by the Constitution of 1787? Article III of the Constitution is a scant three sections long, by far the shortest article of the Constitution that deals with the branches of government. Concerning the direct power granted to the Federal judiciary the Constitution says, “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”[1] Despite the scant manner in which the Constitution outlines the powers granted to the Federal judiciary, Publius and Brutus spend an enormous amount of time devoted to this very question. Publius calls the Federal judiciary, “the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”[2]  The purpose of the Federal judiciary he proposes is to prevent “the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”[3]  One can see that this has been the case on a number of occasions throughout American legal history, most specifically during the New Deal. But for many in the fall of 1787 the ability of the Federal judiciary to prevent these encroachments was further from their minds as to the power of the Federal judiciary. Publius once again counters these fears by asserting that the Federal judiciary will be the weakest of all the branches as it lacks power over the purse and sword. Publius further argues:

Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. [4]

 Brutus attempts to refute this argument made by Publius, asserting that this Federal judiciary will not be a protector and defender of our rights but instead will be just as apt to destroy them as either of the other branches.

            The main authority granted to the Federal judiciary according to Publius and Brutus is the power to strict down laws that are not made in pursuit of the Constitution of the United States. This is the point of contention for Brutus, for he believes that this power alone will give the courts unfettered access to destroy the rights of the people.[5] That the Federal courts will attempt to use their authority to strike down laws to bring it more power is not an unintelligent argument made by Brutus. In fact, it is the better argument made by the two authors. The last half century has seen an attempt by the courts to usurp their constitutionally appointed authority and the authority of both the legislative and executive branches. Brutus also asserts, “This power in the judicial will enable them to mould the government, into almost any shape they please.”[6] Clearly Brutus believes that the meek department of the Federal judiciary argued by Publius is not at all the true nature in which the courts will possess. The notion that the Federal courts will simply attempt to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution and to prevent the encroachment of the legislative power on that of the people held true until the latter half of the twentieth century, when what Brutus predicted came to fruition.

            Next shall be the question of the other powers of the Federal judiciary granted by the Constitution of 1787. Brutus’ main point of contention with these other powers can be summed up in these words, “For, I conceive that the judicial power should be commensurate with the legislative. Or, in other words, the supreme court should have authority to determine questions arising under the laws of the union.”[7] He contends that the Federal judiciary may not have the power to declare what the powers of the legislative branch are, but to merely declare acts of the legislative unconstitutional.[8] When it comes to treaties, Brutus holds that the Federal judiciary may play a role if the treaty in question harms the rights of individual citizens. However to declare the intentions, meaning or nature of the treaty is a power that Brutus wishes not to see in the hands of the Federal judiciary. As Brutus states:

For as treaties will be the law of the land, ever power who have rights or privileges secured by treaty, will have aid of the courts of law, in recovering them. But I do not understand, what is meant by equity arising under a treaty. I presume every right which can be claimed under a treaty, must be claimed by virtue of some article or clause contained in it, which gives the right in plain and obvious words; or at least, I conceive, that the rules for explaining treaties, are so well ascertained, that there is no need of having recourse to an equitable construction. If under this power, the courts are to explain treaties, according to what they conceive their spirit, which is not less than a power to give them whatever extension they may judge proper, it is a dangerous and improper power.[9]

Likewise, Brutus is against the provisions of the Constitution granting jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary to matters stemming from a state and a citizen of another state.[10] Brutus argues, “It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the supreme authority of no state ever submitted to.”[11] This argument by Brutus is horrible; to assert that the source of government’s power ought not to have the authority to reign in it under a court of law is ludicrous. He goes on to argue:

The evil consequences that will flow from the exercise of this power, will best appear by tracing it in its operation. The constitution does not direct the mode in which an individual shall commence a suit against a state or the manner in which the judgement of the court shall be carried into execution, but it gives the legislature full power to pass all laws which shall be proper and necessary for the purpose. And they certainly must make provision for these purposes, or otherwise the power of the judicial will be nugatory. [12]

 Brutus’ argument is not totally unfounded though, as he fears that citizens of one state will attempt to prevent another state from operating properly. Brutus uses the example of the debts owed by the states to their citizens. He believes that the notes given by the states to their citizens can get into the hands of a citizen of another state, allowing for that citizen to take the state to court in order to recoup the money owed them. Long story short, Brutus asserts this will cause the states to go bankrupt and ultimately make them submit to the Federal government.[13]

            Publius on the other hand argues that the authority granted to the Federal judiciary to handle cases in regard to treaties as totally legitimate. He states:

As the denial or the perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith than to the security of the public tranquility.[14]

 Publius is fearful that a foreign nation will take offense if a citizen of their country is sentenced to serve time in another nation. This would certainly cause a breach of public safety, if that other nation wished to wage war or institute other means of punishing them. The ability of the Federal judiciary to oversee matters concerning cases in which treaties are concerned is certainly a matter that Publius thinks need not be contested. If the commonwealth of Massachusetts were to convict a man from France for a crime, it would fall under the Union as a whole to protect the commonwealth from repercussions by the sovereign nation of France. As to the issue concerning one state and the citizen of another, Publius wholly disagrees with Brutus’ assessment. Publius states, “The power of determining causes between two States, or between one State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps no less essential to the peace of the Union than that which has been just examined.”[15] If two states were to enter into disagreement over any trivial matter, it could result in a private war between the two states and possibility of a civil war throughout the whole country. For the Federal government to assert itself into matters between two states or between the citizens of one state against another state is for the protection of the peace and public safety of the whole country. Furthermore, Publius argues, “No man ought certainly to be judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”[16] Under this assertion, Publius believes that the Federal judiciary ought to be given authority over such matters as the impartial judge.

            Clearly it can be seen that both Brutus and Publius were passionate about the subject of the Federal judiciary. Neither men make arguments that are clearly accurate, however that at times both men seem to have the better argument over the other. Brutus’ contention is that the power to rule laws unconstitutional may in fact allow for the Federal judiciary to usurp the authority of the other two branches. However, Publius wins the argument when it comes to matters of treaties and matters arising from the various states. It is based on these observations that it cannot be said that the Federal judiciary has become a mechanism for the leviathan of present-day government. But that it has in many ways remained the vision of Publius, as the impartial protector of individual rights against the usurpation of the Federal and state governments, albeit at times it has come dangerously close to losing itself in the leviathan.


[1]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers.
[2]Article III Section II of the U.S. Constitution of 1787.

[3]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #78

 [4]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #78

 [5]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #78

 [6]“From these considerations the judges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favour it; and that they will do it appears probable.” – Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XI.

[7]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XI

 [8]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

[9]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [10]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [11]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

[12]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution.  Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [13]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [14]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #80

 [15]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #80

 [16]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #80

The polis in Aristotle’s Politics

            The polis is the end of both the household and the village, providing both with their completion in the fullest sense. The polis allows for man to reach his end, or what is best.  Aristotle states, “Again, that for the sake of which [a thing exists], or the end, is what is best; and self-sufficiency is an end and what is best.”[1] Because the polis allows for self-sufficiency it is best above the other two. The polis is superior to the household and village because, “the whole must of necessity be prior to the part…”[2] The household and village are not capable of aiming at the highest and comprehensive goods since they only look and aim at the daily and non-daily needs of life. Since the polis aims at the highest and most comprehensive good, and the others do not, the polis must be superior to them both. Unlike the village, within the polis one can commit the great and noble deeds. Leo Strauss states, “the chief purpose of the city is the noble life…”[3] Yet our modern understanding of state is a partnership that provides for the common defense, ensures domestic tranquility, observes contracts, promotes the prosperity of the people, and provides for the execution of justice. The idea of self-sufficiency or the end of human life are not a concern of the modern state.

Therefore, the translation of polis as “state” is unwarranted. The understanding of state is far different than polis. H.D.F. Kitto states, “It is a bad translation, because the normal polis was not much like a city, and was very much more than a state.”[4] The modern understanding of the purpose of the “state” is that it should secure one’s ability to be happy, along with provide for common defense, ensure domestic tranquility, observe contracts, secure the prosperity of the people and provide for the execution of justice.  Yet the state, unlike the polis does not actually go so far as to ensure man reaches his end. The main purpose of the modern state is to “enable its members to exchange goods and services by protecting them against violence among themselves and foreigners….”[5] The modern state has very little interest in the moral condition of the citizens. Leo Strauss tells us, “In modern times it came to be believed that it is wiser to assume that happiness does not have a definite meaning since different men…have entirely different views as to what constitutes happiness.”[6] As a result to this, Strauss states, “Hence happiness or the highest good could no longer be the common good at which political society aims.”[7] We therefore see that the modern state differs most drastically from the polis on this matter. The ancient polis was aimed at the happiness of individuals, and the people believed in an ultimate good; although this ultimate good may not be the same for all, Aristotle believed there was not  much difference to matter.

The natural state of man can be said to be the polis. The political rule of the polis is the rule among equals. Within the polis everyone ought to be capable of ruling and being ruled. This is the fundamental aspect of the polis, that it is the partnership among equals. Other such partnerships that Aristotle mentions later in the Politics are the tribe and empire, which bothof these has a rule other than that of equals. Modern states are typically either nations (in a much more modern sense of the word) or empires. The understanding of state then is actually not political at all since the rule of the empire is that of master-slave and the tribe lacks civilization or a regime. Thus the alternatives to the polis are in fact non-political.

Aristotle believes that man cannot strive for his ultimate good outside of the polis. Man outside of the polis is not complete and therefore not a man living to his end. The purpose of the politics is to complete or create the good life, or human. The purpose of the polis is to allow man to achieve his ends, thus the political and polis goes hand in hand. The end of human existence, according to Aristotle, is happiness. “Each individual strives for happiness as he understands happiness”, states Leo Strauss, “This striving, which is partly competitive with and cooperatively with the strivings of everyone else, produces or constitutes a kind of web…”[8] The “web” is defined by Strauss as a “society”[9], the understanding of the polis as a society was to promote and help obtain happiness. By allowing man to be fully self-sufficient the city also allows man to strive for what one considers to be happiness.

Aristotle’s understanding of the political comes with his discussion of man as a political animal.Man enters into household and village to provide for his daily and non-daily needs and into the polis to provide for self-sufficiency. Outside of the political, as Aristotle quotes Homer, “he is ‘without clan, without law, without hearth’”.[10]Man is not man when he is outside of the polis, as Aristotle claims “[he] is either a mean sort or superior to man…”[11]From Aristotle’s quote of Homer we find that the political provides from clan (family, household), law (moral virtue, justice and the good), and the hearth. As for Aristotle, man outside of the political is either below man (thus not comprehending justice, injustice, good and bad) or superior to him.

Thus, man must be by nature a political animal because outside of the political he is not a man at all. Above all other creatures, man is a political animal because, “[man] alone has a perception of good and bad and just and unjust and other things [of this sort]…”[12]  The polis attempts to do what nature cannot, promote the good and just while punishing the bad and unjust. Because man alone has knowledge of good and just, bad and unjust he enters into the city because nature is unable to promote one and discourage the other. And ultimately Leo Strauss observes within Aristotle:

The city is by nature, i.e. the city is natural to man; in founding cities men only execute what their nature inclines them to do. Men are by nature inclined to the city because they are by nature inclined to happiness, to living together in a manner which satisfies the needs of their nature in proportion to the natural rank of these needs; the city, one is tempted to say, is the only association which is capable of being dedicated to the life of excellence.[13]

Man’s own nature is what pushes him into the polis, the polis as defined by Aristotle is the only institution that can allow man to be truly happy.  Man by nature strives to be happy, outside of the polis man cannot achieve the natural ends of man and thus man must live within the polis to be truly happy.     

            And yet finally Aristotle asserts the superiority of the polis over man himself. The polis is superior to the individual because household is superior to the individual and the polis is superior to the household. Aristotle states, “For if the individual when separated [from the city] is not self-sufficient, he will be in a condition similar to that of the other parts in relation to the whole.”[14] The relationship between the man and polis for Aristotle is that of the non self-sufficient and the self-sufficient, and the part and the whole. Man’s relationship to the polis as Aristotle sums it up, “One who is incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing through being self-sufficient is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.”[15] The political, therefore, is the relationship between man and the polis. The partnership within the polis, or the regime, sets down the laws, and provides for family life. Without the regime the polis cannot exist, within the polis every person is capable of ruling or being ruled and thus the regime is the rule between equals. This type of rule is the most political of all rules.

            The modern conception of the state differs greatly from that of the polis. The polis is aimed at the complete life; the polis is the means of reaching the highest good or ultimate happiness. The state on the other hand is only concerned with the external; it is limited in the aspects of life. As a result, the word state cannot be used for polis and such the word polis has no English meaning. Political is the total relationship between people, and between men and the polis.

 [1]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2 lines 1252b  33-34 & 1253a1

 [2]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2 line 1253a 20

 [3]The City and Man by Leo Strauss, part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 31.

 [4]The City and Man by Leo Strauss, part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 31.

 5]The Greeks: The Polis ch. 5 by H.D.F. Kitto page 1 on word document.

 [6]The City and Man by Leo Strauss part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 32

 [7]The City and Man by Leo Strauss part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 31

 [8]The City and Man by Leo Strauss part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 31

 [9]The City and Man by Leo Strauss part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 32

 [10]The City and Man by Leo Strauss part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 32

 [11]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2 lines 1253a  4-5

[12]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2  line 1253a  4

 [13]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2 line 1253a 16-17

 [14]The City and Man by Leo Strauss, part 1 “On Aristotle’s Politics” page 41

 [15]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2 line 1253a  26-28

 [16]Aristotle’s Politics book 1 chapter 2 line 1253a 28-29

Published in: on March 24, 2008 at 16:20  Leave a Comment  

Communization of Thought and Plato’s Republic

Former Associate Justice of the United States Potter Stewart once said, “Censorship reflects society’s lack of confidence in itself. It is the hallmark of an authoritarian regime.” Plato’s Republic presents the question of whether or not one can have private thought in the perfectly just city. This question expands itself into whether or not any regime, just or unjust, can survive without at least nominal communization of thought. It appears throughout history that communization of thought has always been attempted on some scale. Does the perfectly just city, however, require the communization of thought as every other city does?

Three central questions loom over us at the present time. Is it possible to have communization of thought, totally or at all? Can a regime survive with or without communization of thought? And finally, can the perfectly just city as Plato describes in the Republic have communization of thought and still be just?

In order to find whether it is possible to achieve communization of thought, one only need look back through history and find examples. To answer the question of whether or not communization of thought is possible I offer this argument. For 1500 years the Catholic Church was able to control the religious views of Western Europe with little resistance. For seventy years the Soviet Union was able to control the thought of most of Eastern Europe. For twelve years Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party were able to indoctrinate the German people into National Socialist thought.[1]

When a class of educated American students is polled on whether communization of thought is possible each of them responds, “No. There is a right to private thought.” Thus they too demonstrate their lower education teachers have indoctrinated them well. In Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan he says, “it is his [the sovereign’s] duty to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also, and security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.”[2] This is an echo from Plato’s Republic, where Socrates asserts that the guardians must be educated so that they do not attack their own city but only their enemies.[3] Hobbes even goes on to say, “the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government they see in their neighbor nations, more than with their own…”[4]  Once again Hobbes echo’s Socrates’ sentiments concerning the education.[5] This education has one goal in mind, to create a communization of thought among the guardian class.

We thus have three examples, out of many, of communization of thought in practice and an author who encourages the education of youth that is similar, though not the same, as that of the just city.

However, can a regime survive a communization of thought? Can it survive without communization of thought? Certainly one can view the Soviet Union and realize that what started the dissolution was the introduction of private thought into society. Socrates even asserts that communization of thought is necessary for the survival of the city.[6] In order to keep peace and order with in the city, and rebellion out of the city, Socrates proposes the introduction of the noble lie. He intends for this lie to make the citizens believe that they are all equals, and that they all have the same mother.[7] However, at the same time it is used to introduce the one person, one job theory through the analogy of the metals. This demonstrates the mixture of myth and law into the city, which allows for the communization of thought to be stronger than when it is simply done through myth or law. The founders of the city will also determine what is proper for the citizens to read, and what the proper manner they should be educated in is. Private thought will only be possible through the rose colored glasses of the regime; that is to say that the citizens may have private thought but it will reflect the beliefs of the regime as have been taught to the citizens. Certainly without some form of communization of thought, the city is unable to survive.

Finally we are asked to inquire whether the perfectly just city is able to have communization of thought, or private thought, and remain just. At the onset of the Republic, Socrates makes it appear that Athens is not a just city. In order to see what justice is Socrates suggests to Glaucon and Adeimantus that they should construct a just city in order to see where justice is at. Socrates does not suggest that they should examine Athens and determine where justice is in the city. By the beginning of book V Socrates is spurred on to discuss the communization of women and children despite not having completely formulated his position in his mind. It is from here that the reader is asked to ponder the question of communization of thought. Throughout the construction of this city, Socrates discusses the education of the citizens. This education leads to a communization of thought, but does not totally outlaw private thought as long as it reflects the regime’s beliefs.

Does this city truly have private thought? Citizens who speak against the beliefs of the regime are to be silenced. The works of Homer are not to be read by the citizens because they reflect a negative understanding of the gods by the regime.[8]  This city does not, in fact, have private thought because all thought is dependent on the beliefs of the regime. The just city will also allow for the philosopher to philosophize without being molested.  It appears that the city constructed by Socrates is not at all able to accommodate the philosopher.

In the process of discussing the city Glaucon says in response to Socrates, “I for one agree that our citizens must behave this way toward their opponents; and toward the barbarians they must behave as the Greeks do now toward one another.”[9] This city that has been constructed by Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus is a Greek city. Socrates has already alluded to the fact that the Greek cities are not just, as he seeks to construct the just city instead of examining it. Thus Socrates is asserting that the just city will not have communization of thought. He has demonstrated that it is possible to obtain communization in thought, but it is not the reflection of the perfectly just city. The just city will come into being when the philosopher is king. Freedom of thought is essential for the philosopher, who questions the conventions of the city. The philosopher questions the teachings of the city as if they are only opinion and not truth. Yet this city that has been constructed seeks to assert that their opinion is the truth. The perfectly just city will not stand when thought is communized, but will rather fall into tyranny.

The communization spoken of by Socrates is through myth and law; philosophy aims to correct myth, which is opinion. When the philosopher is king there will be no need for law. The communization of thought referenced in the Republic, and spoken of by Hobbes and implemented by various nations is not proper for the just city. In order for the just city and for communization of thought to coexist, truth must be the basis for the communization of thought.


 [1]Neither the Soviet Union, nor Nazi Germany achieved the success of Sparta, which many scholars say was the basis of the just city in the Republic. However, both nations have similar aspects to Sparta and the just city of the Republic, which makes them both important examples on this question. Neither the Soviet Union nor Nazi Germany achieved communization of thought through both myths nor law as Socrates seeks it in the Republic; instead they achieve it through law only.

 [2]Leviathan, Part II chapter xxx section 6

 [3]“Then, it’s appropriate for the rulers…” Book III, line 389C

 [4]Leviathan, Part II chapter xxx section 7

 [5]416 B “Mustn’t we…”; 465 B “Since they are free…”; 470 E “Now observe…”; I fully recognize that the education spoken of in Hobbes and the education discussed in the Republic are not the same, however the sentiments are similar in so far as it is necessary to educate.

 [6]“For sound rearing and education, when they are preserved, produce good natures; and sound natures, in their turn receiving such an education, grow up still better than those before them, for procreation as well as for the other things, as is also the case with the other animals.” Book IV, line 424A/B

 [7]414 D-415 B

 [8]“We’ll beg Homer and the other poets not to be harsh if we strike out these and all similar things…” 387B

 [9]Plato’s Republic book V line 471b

At the footsteps of history

Tonight was an amazing night. I spent five hours in downtown Dallas at the John McCain rally. While I am not the biggest support of McCain I am glad to see that the Republic primary race is over and we have our candidate. I am prepared to stand 100% behind McCain as I believe him to be the best possible choice for the next President of the United States.

Aside from seeing McCain, my friends and I also had the opportunity to meet a reporter from a small South Carolinian newspaper. I felt wonderful getting out there and meeting all these people who were true patriots and wanted to be involved in politics. For those who don’t know the significance of being a patriot and being involved in politics read my blog post about the movie Blue State on the topic of true patriotism.

Published in: on March 4, 2008 at 22:50  Comments (2)  
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