Generals Make Lackluster Presidents


Consider this unique fact, 12 of our United States Presidents have held the rank of General in the United States Army. None held the same rank in the Marine Corps or Air Force and there has never been an Admiral attain the Presidency. Does this mean that Americans have viewed Army Generals as better suited for the Presidency, or just that they are more in the spotlight during wartime? Certainly none of the Army Generals who have attained the Presidency had stellar Presidencies. In fact, more times than not the former General turned President has been a controversial figure in his own time as well as in ours. The Presidents who have served this nation as Generals fall into two categories: Forgotten and Controversial. Only one of our General turned Presidents has been remembered in a positive light: George Washington. Yet, even his Presidency was forgettable if it weren’t for the fact he was the first President.

Of those Presidents who were Generals and have been forgotten by History, there were: William Henry Harrison, Zachary Tyler, Franklin Pierce, US Grant, Rutherford B. Hayes, James Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, Benjamin Harrison, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. William Henry Harrison is largely forgotten for one simple fact: his Presidency lasted exactly one month. In fact, aside from Grant, Garfield, and Eisenhower most of these Presidents are totally forgotten by history. Grant and Eisenhower are by far the most well-known of these three Presidents, having served as the General of the Armies during the Civil War and WWII respectfully. In both cases the men were remembered more for their on field conquests and less for their Oval Office successes.  James Garfield was the second President to be slain by an assasian, having died 6 months and 15 days into his Presidency.  All of these men deserve the respect of a grateful nation for serving our nation in both the Military and Presidency. They respresent one key fact, however, and is just because you were a General doesn’t mean you should be President.

Two men in our Nation’s history have gained attention not because they were great Generals, although one was, but because they served very controversial Presidencies. Andrew Jackson, called by his contempories “King Andrew I” was the hero of the Battle of New Orleans during the War of 1812. As a President he was known to ignore his political enemies, basically everyone, and to veto any legislation he didn’t agree with, almost everything. Jackson was the first President to receive a Censure from Congress and was the first President after the epic fall of the Era of Good Feelings (which ended when he first tried to attain the Presidency and lost to John Q. Adams in 1824.) Jackson’s record is most tarneshed for his Indian Policy, which resulted in the Indian Removal Act that saw Tribes relocated from the East to the Great Plains.

Like Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson was less remembered by history for his military service during the Civil War and more for his failed Presidency. To give some credit to Johnson, he was expected to follow in the wake of Abraham Lincoln’s assasination. Johnson was a southerner by birth, Tennessee,  and a Democrat but remained loyal to the Union when the South seceded. He struggled with his Congress over the question of Reconstruction and was eventually impeached twice (more than any other President) but escaping conviction both times. Little is actually remembered about Andrew Johnson’s Presidency that would be classified as “good”.

So while we celebrate President’s Day today, the third Monday of the Month of February, we should remember that just because one was a General doesn’t mean that one should be President of the United States. None of our General-Presidents have turned out all that great for the United States.

Emergence of the American Military Power


Have you ever wondered where the military power of the United States came from? We haven’t always been a super power capable of destroying our enemies, our friends, and ourselves.  For most of the early years of the American republic we had to rely on allies to assists us in our military campaigns. The French aided us in the American Revolution, although we did have minor successes prior to their entry into the war. We fought to a stalemate with the English during the War of 1812, yet our Nation’s Capital was burned down.

We were able to defeat the Mexicans during the Mexican-American War, but we still weren’t a super power. We had to rely on the British to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the Western Hemisphere is closed to European Colonization. Yet, one event in American History stands alone as ushering in the advent of American military supremacy.

During the Civil War advancements in technology were made that made obsolete all other militaries in the world. The mini ball made for more accurate gun fire, destroying a military fighting style that had spanned centuries. The CSS Hunley was only the second major attempt by Americans to create submarine power (the USS Turtle was used during the American Revolution, which was a one man submarine that operated on a similar concept as the Hunley.) And ultimately, the clash of the Iron Clads (CSS Merrimack & USS Monitor) made all other navies in the world obsolete. By the end of the Civil War there were over 1 Million soldiers in America’s Army. Within a couple years that number would drop significantly to 125,000 military personal.

In the wake of the Civil War and the assassination, and attempted assassination, of President Abraham Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson and Secretary of State Seward two nations attempted to capitalize on a war torn nation. Emperor Louis Napoleon III had fashioned himself as a French Andrew Jackson, but like his famous ancestor became an Emperor. With the coup that destroyed the French Second Republic, Napoleon sought to take advantage of a perceived weak America.

Napoleon conspired with the Arch-Duke Maximilian of Austria to take over Mexico and create an Empire that would threaten the existence of the United States. Secretary Seward recovered from a carriage accident and being stabbed in a failed assassination attempt the night Lincoln was shot by Booth to challenge Napoleon’s plan. General Grant sent 50,000 soldiers and General Sheridan to the Texas-Mexican border to secure America from an attack. In the mean time Seward sent General Schofield to deter Napoleon from his plan. Publicly Seward published a letter to the Emperor that was more diplomatic than what Schofield was sent to deliver. Napoleon backed down and the Mexicans murdered the Arch-Duke.

In the mean time, the British were attempting to secure Canada from the United States. War was England was eminent during the Civil War, it was only Ambassador Charles Francis Adams  (Son of John Q. Adams and grandson of John Adams) that helped prevent war from breaking out. The British, Sir John A.  MacDonald created a plan to create the Kingdom of Canada, a confederacy of the Canada territories. When northerners along the border cried for war, the English monarch Queen Victoria signed into law a bill creating the Dominion of Canada; regardless, the damage was done and a permanent reminder of the English monarchy was created. And in a major coup for the United States, Secretary of State Seward purchased Alaska from the Russians. This purchased, declared “Seward’s Folly” and “Seward’s Ice Box” was actually a tactical victory for the United States. With Alaska, the United States surrounded Canada from the South and the West. The arctic circle to the north meant that Canada only had it’s Eastern boarder free from America. In the event of a war with England, the United States could secure Canada and blockade it’s Eastern shore ports.

The United States came out of the Civil War a military power house. Over the next thirty years the US would continue to grow stronger as the industrial revolution took hold. By the time the United States went to war with Spain she had one of the strongest navies in the world, and was able to defeat the once mighty Spanish. Following the destruction of Europe in World War I, the United States stood as the most complete and most powerful military in the world. It wouldn’t be until the end of the Second World War that the U.S. was officially a super power, with enough fire power to destroy the world.

Sultans of the Legislature


We don’t have great legislators anymore. The era of great men in our national legislature is gone, never to be revived and almost barely remembered. John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay are three of the most important legislators our nation has ever had, or will ever have again. While their ambition led them to strive for the President’s office, none achieved this end. Instead, they each spent their careers in the Senate working to improve upon what the Founders had given them. A connection to the Founding generation, many Americans looked to these men for guidance; and their leadership in the Senate has been matched by no one. While they all had monumental foibles (Calhoun was a secessionist, and Clay was a slave holder to be specific) they all contributed greatly to the course of the 19th century. And while ultimately their actions indirectly lead to our Civil War, they also helped preserve the union throughout the course of their lives.

While we have had men and women in the Legislature, none can match the fame and notoriety Calhoun, Clay and Webster achieved in the middle of the 19th century. And in particular, none of this Nation’s previous great Legislators remained in the the Legislature. Madison eventually succeeded Jefferson in the Presidency, and he is the only other great legislator worth mentioning in the 19th century. In the 20th century we had LBJ and Gerald Ford, both of whom eventually went on to serve lack luster terms as President of the United States. If nothing else, the three Sultans of the Senate were saved from a the failures suffered by Madison, Johnson and Ford in the oval office. While both Clay and Calhoun found themselves in the Vice Presidency and in other various cabinet positions, neither had a realistic chance of winning the Presidency. Clay was the great compromiser, and for good or ill he helped save the Union from a civil war on numerous occasions ending with the Compromise of 1850. Webster, known as “Godlike Dan” eventually became known as “Black Dan” when he saw the prudence in supporting Clay’s Compromise of 1850. And while Calhoun helped advance the policy of secession in the South, he was a pivotal player in the United States Senate.

A close study of the period in American History from 1820-1856 cannot be fully understood without examining the lives and careers of John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. It is undoubted in an age dominated by the Presidency that we will ever again see legislators that can match the legacy these three men left behind.

Roman Foreign Policy between 264 and 146 B.C: Why They Fought


From the First Punic War through the Third Punic War there was much change in the reasoning for Rome going to war.  Roman conquest of Italy in the years leading up to the First Punic War gave the Romans confidence about their military power. Their success at unifying most of Italy under the Roman banner must have given them an adrenaline rush to spur them into a war with Carthage in an attempt to take Sicily. Successive wars appear to have been encouraged by Roman desire to dominate trade throughout the Mediterranean world.

Roman involvement in the First Punic War was spurred on by ambition to add Sicily to their territory. The Second Punic War and the wars with Greece were brought on primarily through a desire to dominate trade.  The wars with Spain and the Third Punic War, however, appear to harken back to the desires which spurred on the First Punic War and the Italian wars.

According to Polybius, the First Punic War marked the first time the Romans engaged in sea warfare. Whether or not this is completely true or not does not detract from how important such an idea is to the motives of going to war. There is little doubt that the Romans probably engaged in at least some minimal trade prior to this war. Yet Polybius’ account of the construction of wartime vessels demonstrates that the Romans most likely had not yet engaged in naval battles[1]. If this account is true then the motives for going to war over Sicily were not about trade, at least not entirely. To some degree Rome must have sought to have dominion over Sicily and to remove foreign influence in Italy all together. Polybius’ account of the treaty between Rome and Carthage, which ended the First Punic War, gives further credence to the idea Rome was not fighting for the sole purpose of trade. Polybius says, “’The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily…. The Carthaginians to give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians to pay to the Romans by installments in twenty years 2,200 Euboen talents’’[2] Polybius also accounts that the Roman people demanded, “they reduced the time of the payment by one half, added 1,000 talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.”[3] These accounts given by Polybius support the belief that Rome’s first conquest outside of Italy was spurred on by a desire to continue unifying Italy, or at least to expand the territory they possessed.

The Second Punic War and the wars subsequently with Greece on the other hand were almost entirely about improving trade and Roman economic status. The Second Punic War was triggered by Carthaginian interference with a Roman ally in Spain. While the sources concerning the war do not directly demonstrate that this war was about economic gain through trade, it is clear through the terms of the treaty that the war was at least on some level about trade. Polybius once again demonstrates, “they were to surrender their ships of war, with exception of ten triremes.”[4] Without their former naval power the Carthaginians would be hard pressed to continue trading on such a scale as they once enjoyed. This left Rome as the most dominate naval power in the Western Mediterranean both militarily and trade wise. Without war ships the Carthaginians could not protect their trading vessels from pirates and other warring states.

With the Western Mediterranean locked up Rome focused her attention on the Eastern half. Rome’s attempt to subdue the Eastern Mediterranean was not so much like their attempts in the West. Unlike the West, the Romans did not seek to have dominion over the East. Instead the Romans sought to dismantle the alliances and empires throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. By doing this Rome was successful in destroying the economic power of the East. Their tactics with the East resemble in some manner their attempts in Italy to subdue the Latin tribes.

The Third Punic War and the wars with Spanish tribes appear to be more about revenge and expansion of the Empire than about acquisition of wealth. Carthage had been the nail in the Roman’s side for better part of a century. When they finally broke the Treaty of Zama the Romans found the opportunity to finally put Carthage away for good. With Carthage completely destroyed the Romans were able to take dominion over all of North Africa and eliminated the only threat to Roman dominance in the Western Mediterranean for good. If for nothing else the Roman destruction of Carthage demonstrated for her enemies that Rome could, if brought to bear, annihilate any and all foes. The Third Punic War demonstrates an almost entirely unique episode in Roman foreign policy between 264 and 146 B.C. It was not about acquisition of land, nor of furthering trade. Rather the Third Punic War was about revenge for the Romans.

In Spain however, the attempts by the Romans were almost entirely over conquest of land. Unlike Carthage and the Eastern Mediterranean, Spain was not governed by formal empires or kingdoms. With the ever expanding population in Italy, the Romans needed more space for citizens. Spain was the prime location after the Second Punic War. Unfortunately for the Romans the Spanish tribes were troublesome and required a full on assault to attempt to subdue Spain; even then, the Spanish tribes were not completely subdue until the time of Caesar Augustus. Yet Rome’s conquests in Spain were necessary in order to provide more land for her citizens. Not only was this, but Spain was rich in minerals, specifically in silver which was important to the Romans.  However, the Roman desire to conquer Spain was not primarily out of a desire to exploit Spain but rather to incorporate it.

Rome’s foreign policy from 264-146 B.C. was spurred on by two primary motives: expansion and trade. Ultimately, however, the Romans desired to create a Mediterranean wide empire. The true motive behind the Roman foreign policy was simply and purely imperialism. While their foreign policy began with an attempt to have more sovereignty, such as in the First Punic War, it ultimately landed on the need and desire for more territory as was the case in the Spanish wars.


[1] Naphatali Lewis and Meyer Reinhold, Roman Civilization, vol. 1, Selected ReadingsThe Republic and the Augustan Age, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 159-160

[2] Lewis 161.

[3] Lewis, 162.

[4] Lewis, 180

Alienation in Post World War America


World War II ended with the surrender of the Japanese Empire in August 1945 leaving a wake of destruction on almost every continent. America was elated, not only had they defeated the Nazis but the Japanese were defeated as well. Yet, America’s place in the world changed as a result of the war in a way very few people would have thought possible. Only an up and coming nation in the last World War, the United States emerged from World War II as the preeminent world power. Amidst the jubilation of victory in both theaters of war, Americans had to come to grips not only with America’s new place in the world, but with what had happened in the war to America. The story of Holden Caulfield in The Catcher in the Rye demonstrates the alienation some particular Americans felt in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The beginning of The Catcher in the Rye takes the reader to a boarding school and a character named Holden Caulfield. Holden is arguably one of the most controversial characters in literature, but his story is an important one as it is the story of America after World War II. Holden’s alienation from the rest of the world is central in his story. Throughout most of the story Holden is unable to find the good in the world and insists that everyone he knows or meets is a phony. Holden is a confused young man who is attempting to reconcile the world of his childhood with the world of his young adulthood. At sixteen when the story takes place, Holden was born two years after the stock market crashed and was still too young when the United States entered the Second World War in December, 1941. America, in a lot of ways, has grown up rapidly in the span of Holden’s short life.

The main antagonists in Holden’s life are his roommate Stradlater, his neighbor Ackley, a friend from home Sally, and a pimp and a prostitute he meets while staying in New York. In each case, the antagonists choose to ignore the realities of life by distracting themselves with sex, money or theater. Holden faults each character for being a phony, and considers his dead brother Allie, and his younger sister Phoebe as two of the only real people he has ever met. Holden has been affected by the war and its aftermath and maintains a child-like opinion of the world. In fact, he states, “Certain things they should stay the way they are. You ought to be able to stick them in those big glass cases and just leave them alone.”[1] Holden is alienated from those who are his age, or close because of his own inability to grow up. The various encounters Holden ha leave him more alienated than before. In the case of Sally, Holden contacts her and makes a date only to alienate himself from her by saying:  “You give me a royal pain in the ass…”[2] Holden is completely unable to maintain friendships and continues to draw further and further away from the world.

As Holden is unable to maintain friendships with anyone he meets, he is also a contradiction. At the beginning of the book he states, “If there’s one thing I hate, it’s the movies.”[3] And yet he goes to see a movie at Radio City after his date with Sally. He goes into the bar at his hotel and has a low opinion of everything about it from where they seat him, to the band, to the patrons.[4] Holden constantly belittles people, places and things only to turn around and immerse himself in them. This further alienates him from the world and people around him as they view him as an immature person.[5] His sense of superiority, which results in his alienation, prevents Holden from having any meaningful relationships with anyone aside from his sister and dead brother Allie.

Holden is so disillusioned with the world around him that the only thing he can think to do is protect those who he views as innocent. Holden’s depression is lifted whenever he is around kids. The first instance the reader sees this is in the streets of New York. On his way to find a record store open on Sundays, Holden follows a family of three. The parents are on the sidewalk and immediately gain the disapproval of Holden when he says, “They looked sort of poor, which implies that Holden views the family, at least the parents, as beneath him. The child, however, entertains Holden as he is walking behind the family. The child is in the street singing, “‘If a body catch a body coming through the rye.’” The child and song make Holden, “feel better. It made me feel not so depressed any more.”[6] Holden is not alienated from children the way he is from those closer in age to him because he is able to find a truth in children that doesn’t exist for him in his contemporaries.

Holden’s alienation goes even further, to a desire to remove himself completely from society. At first, Holden pleads with Sally to, “drive up to Massachusetts or Vermont….We’ll stay in these cabin camps and stuff like that till the dough runs out…I could get a job somewhere and we could live somewhere with a brook and all….I could chop wood in the wintertime and all.”[7] His feeling of superiority has alienated him not only from any meaningful relationships but also a desire to quit society almost all together. Later on he says, “Everybody’d think I was just a poor deaf-mute bastard and they’d leave me alone. They’d let me put gas and oil in their stupid cars, and they’d pay me a salary and all for it, and I’d build me a little cabin somewhere with the dough I made and live there the rest of my life.”[8] Both times, Holden suggests leaving society to live away from a world he doesn’t fully believe he belongs to.

Holden’s alienation also drives him to attempt to save those he believes he cares most about. In his first desire to leave society, he invites Sally to go with him only to alienate himself from her when she refuses to go with him. Holden also feels a need to assist a roommate at a previous school before he ultimately rejects him. His roommate Dick Slagle is poorer than Holden and doesn’t have as fancy of luggage as he has. As Holden describes the situation: “The thing is, it’s really hard to be roommates with people if your suitcases are much better than theirs…”[9] But he goes on to clarify, “You think if they’re intelligent and all, the other person, and have a good sense of humor, that they don’t give a damn whose suitcases are better, but they do.”[10] Holden both creates his own alienation, as in the case of Sally, and is a victim of society’s mandated alienation as was the case with the former roommate. Yet in both cases, Holden attempts to save that person from the phony world as Holden perceives it.

Finally, Holden’s struggle not to care about what others think or do and his desire to save people from their phoniness comes to a head. His sister Phoebe questions whether or not Holden actually likes anything, or if he simply hates everything.[11] As he avoids Phoebe’s questions, she finally prompts him, “All right, name something else. Name something you’d like to be.”[12] And it is here that Holden admits to his desire to protect children and to allow them to maintain their innocence when he tells Phoebe, “I’d just be the catcher in the rye and all.”[13] Holden’s alienation from friends closer in age; his hatred of cars and movies all stem from his own desire to return and protect the innocence of childhood.

Yet, it takes Holden until he has nearly broken down psychologically that he realizes he can’t protect everyone from everything. While on the way to  deliver a note to Phoebe at her school, Holden notices writing on the walls outside the school. He desires to protect the innocence of the children from the writing  and dreams of killing the person responsible for writing obscenities on the school’s walls. The second time he finds the obscenities, however, he realizes that it has been craved into the wall.[14] It is at this point that Holden comes to the realization, “If you had a million years to do it in, you couldn’t rub out even half the ‘Fuck you’ signs in the world. It’s impossible.”[15] He finally realizes that things won’t return to how they were when he was a child and life was simpler. Holden recognizes that the world is full of things he hates and wants to protect others from but it is a fool’s mission to try to protect the world from all the bad.

The story of Holden Caulfield could be analogous to the story of the United States after World War II. Like Holden, the United States was alienated from the rest of the world, including our allies. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States had a responsibility not shared by her allies. Both the Soviet Union and the allies of the United States differed from the U.S.and did not seem to share many beliefs held by America. The United States, as well as Holden, had to come to grips with the reality of the world. Holden was never going to achieve living in a world where people were to be exactly as he wanted to be more ready to believe exactly what he believed. Holden is defined by his alienation from the world and weather he is finally able to reconcile himself with both the world and people around him.


[1] Salinger, J.D. The Catcher in the Rye(Boston: Little Brown and Company 1951) page 122.

[2] Ibid. 133

[3] Ibid. 2

[4] “they gave me a lousy table anyways…”, “The band was putrid”, “show-offy-looking guys with their dates.” Ibid. 69

[5] “Same old Caulfield. When are you going to grow up?” Ibid, 144

[6] Ibid. 115

[7] Ibid. 132

[8] Ibid. 199

[9] Ibid. 109

[10] Ibid.

[11] “You don’t like anything that’s happening.” Ibid. 169

[12] Ibid. 172

[13] Ibid. 173

[14] “I saw something that drove me crazy…”, “I went down by a different staircase….” Ibid. 201, 202

[15] Ibid.

 

How the Constitution provides for energy and stability while maintaining liberty and republicanism through separation of powers.


Energy and stability have been the greatest questions in government since the ancients first developed the polis. Prior to the United States, no country made better efforts to perfect the art of separation of powers than England has made. Publius describes in Federalist 37 the need for stability and energy in the new government, while at the same time protecting the liberty of the people and the republican way of life. The Constitution of 1787 achieves these aims through a separation of powers between the three branches of the Federal government and the specific make up of the departments.

In order to understand Publius’ argument better, it would be best to take his argument in Federalist 37 first, followed by his discussion of the relationship between the three branches of government. Lastly I will view his discussion of the specific make up of the various branches of the United States Government.

Publius argues for the necessity of a separation of powers in the new government in order to provide for the necessary stability and energy in government while protecting liberty and republicanism. In order to do this he argues that there most be present a separation of powers between the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches of government. Furthermore, there must be a separation of powers between that of the States and Federal governments. Publius says, “Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and to republican form.”[1] The first attempt at creating a republic with the Articles of Confederation failed due to a lack of energy and stability within the government, thus it was pertinent to create in the new government fixes for these problems. Publius then goes on to explain:

The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments; and that even this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands.[2]

This is the genius of the new Constitution according to Publius, it has attained the short periods of appointment and dividing the government among many hands. In order that the liberty of the people is not offended, they must remain the source of power for the government.

Yet this is not enough, in order to understand how this present in the Constitution Publius explains further in papers 47-51. In the first of these papers, Publius addresses the allegations by opponents of the proposed plan that it lacks a separation of powers. Publius explains Montesquieu’s argument for the separation of powers by saying, “he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other.”[3] The magistrate must have the authority to not only enforce the laws passed by the legislative, but also to veto laws that violate the Constitution, and the judicial cannot create laws but can advise the legislative.[4] Publius then goes on to demonstrate that the various Constitutions of the states provide for more blending of the branches of government than the proposed Federal Constitution.

And then in Federalist 48 Publius describes how the Federal Constitution provides a defense through a moderate blend of the branches of government. At first he argues:

But in a representative republic where the executive magistracy is carefully limited, both in the extent and duration of his power, and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people out to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.[5]

So in order to prevent the encroachments of the legislative on the rights and liberties of the people, the executive and judicial branches must have authority to reign in the power of the legislative. The legislative is also apt to encroach on the power and freedom of the other branches through pay[6], and thus they must be limited on how they are able to alter the pay of these other branches. Publius provides examples of Virginia and Pennsylvania where the powers of the legislative were not protected against and the judicial and executive branches were usurped by the authority of the legislative. Having demonstrated the dangers of allowing unbridled power to exist within the legislative branch, Publius goes on to explain how it might be possible to prevent the encroachments of one branch on the power of another.

Federalist 49 provides for this explanation and Publius defines that the people alone are the source of charter for the Constitution and its parts. Thus the people alone should be consulted when the powers of the Constitution are in question as to demolishing them, or creating a new power.[7] Appeals to the people are necessary in order to prevent the encroachments of power by the various branches. Yet frequent appeals are insufficient in protecting the freedom of the society. Not only this but it is impossible, as Publius explains, “The members of the executive and judiciary departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a small part only of the people.”[8] Yet the legislative is many in number and can be known by a larger number of the people.[9] Thus the legislative would be most likely to take advantage of the appeals from the people and thus encroach on the various powers of the other branches. As such frequent appeals of the people could turn out to be bad for the stability, energy and liberty of the society as the legislative might take their appeals as a mandate. And so how this can be moderated is discussed next by Publius.

Publius states at the beginning of Federalist 50, “It may be contended, perhaps, that instead of occasional appeals to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against them, periodical appeals are proper…”[10] In order to achieve this, Publius argues that a fixed period for appeals to the people could be detrimental to the purpose of those appeals. If they are too close together Publius argues, “the measures to be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions.”[11] Yet by the same token, if they are too far apart then the people are likely not to know each other and to be unaware of the circumstances which lead to the need for revisions. [12] To demonstrate his point, Publius once again looks to the states for an example. He tells of how in Pennsylvania there had been a meeting of censorial council to remedy the defects of their Constitution. He elucidates however that the members of the council were prominent citizens who were members of the parties within the state. Secondly, some of the members of the council had served in the legislative and executive departments. Third, the proceedings of the council were disrupted by the factionalism of the members themselves. And finally, the council either did not understand the limits placed on the legislative and executive, or the legislative completely ignored the changes made by the censorial council.[13] Publius demonstrates properly the difficulty of having occasional or frequent appeals to the people for the remedy of the defects for the Constitution.

And so Publius goes on to discuss in Federalist 51 the structure of the government in regards to checks and balances. He states, “it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.”[14] The importance of each department having its own will is demonstrated in the preceding papers, where Publius demonstrates the likely chances of an encroachment and usurpation by the legislative. In order to achieve this, Publius also states, “It is equally evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for the emoluments annexed to their offices.”[15] Thus the departments must have a will of their own and should not be made dependent on the other departments for their pay. But at the same time Publius argues that the members of the various departments must be given the constitutional means and personal motives to protect against the encroachment of another department on their own.[16] Publius argues, “The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It must be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”[17] However, Publius also reminds the reader that the legislative must be predominant in republics. In order to properly control the legislative against usurpation Publius argues:

The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.[18]

By dividing the authority of the legislative, a republic is capable of controlling the growth of power and influence of the legislative. Yet this is not enough, as Publius points out it is important in a “compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.”[19] By dividing the legislative, you weaken its ability to encroach on the authority of the other branches. But by dividing the government into two different governments and allotting them different powers a republic can prevent the creation of a tyranny.

However, one question still remains and that is how the different bodies of government are erected for the purposes presented in Federalist 51. The various branches must be provided with different powers so that no one branch can consolidate that power. The branches must also have varying degrees of separation from the people, so that the passions of the majority cannot rule in society. In regards to the legislative branch, the branch should be split into two distinct houses with one having more of a dependence and response to the people than the other. As the legislative branch is closest to the people, and thus lays one of legislative threats, it is proper that it be divided so as to limit this closeness with the people. The first branch of the legislative Publius discusses is thus the House of Representatives, which is designed to be the department most dependent on the people. Publius describes, “As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”[20] The House of Representatives will only share in the legislative authority of the government and will be able to respond to the passions of the people while the upper house will be able to filter out the reason. This great authority constitutes a need for a shorter duration of power as Publius states, “It is a received and well-founded maxim that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the great out to be its duration…”[21] Further, the House of Representatives will be watched not only by the people through its direct dependence on them, but also by the collateral branch of the legislative.

Next Publius discusses the Senate, which serves as the connection between the States and the Federal government as directed by the un-amended Constitution.  On this Publius states, “It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.”[22] So that the States retain some type of authority under the new Constitution, it is important that they be given the authority to appoint the members of the Senate. The advantage of this stands that now law cannot be passed without the consent of both the people and the States.[23] And it also serves as a way to prevent members of the legislative body from forgetting their constituents by requiring the laws to be passed by both distinct bodies. Publius goes on to say:

The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by the factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.[24]

The Senate’s mutability is important as well, so that the members restrain their passions and tyrannical nature. By having the Senate elected by the States, the States have their own elections for government offices. By changing the government representatives in the States, the Senate will be apt to change and thus opinions will be changed. Their length of office will allow the Senate the opportunity to learn the laws of the nation as well, and so that they are not constantly changing and that the opinions and measures remain some what consistent.[25] The importance of the Senate within the make up of checks and balances and separation of powers is clear. It serves as a check on the passions of the people, while balancing the representation of the States within the Federal government. Further the two branches of the legislative provide for stability and energy in the new government by removing the passions of the people and allowing for competition within the branches.

Thus next Publius discusses the executive branch, by far the most controversial of the day and most in need of defense by Publius. Publius discusses the mode of electing the President in Federalist 68. As with the legislative, the mode of electing the President must have a way of preventing the passions of the majority from ruling. Thus the Electoral College was devised as a way of preventing the encroachments of the people’s passions from entering into the election of the President. Publius describes, “It was equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation.”[26] By doing this the Electoral College is made up of a small number of individuals so that deliberation is permitted in the election of the new President. Publius says, “This process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of the President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”[27] As for the proper place of the executive in the stability and energy of government, he is of the most importance. As Publius says, “A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory must be, in practice, a bad government.”[28] The executive must be strong and energetic in order to properly execute the laws he is charged to enforce. Publius calls “united; duration; an adequate provision for its support; and competent powers”[29] to be what constitutes an energetic executive. Energy is found in unity as in a single person the powers of the executive can be carried out quickly without delay. If the executive power were divided among more than one person, it would be subject to deliberation which will prevent an energetic executive. [30] Likewise, the President’s tenure of office is important for his energy. The duration of office is also an important element in the stability of the executive. If he stays too long, then he is apt to be too firm and possibly encroach on the powers of the legislative. Yet if he is tenure is too short then he is apt to fall prey to the legislative.[31] Shortness in the tenure of office is also likely to prevent the interest of the executive from performing his duties. This is also the argument used by Publius in Federalist 72 in regards to the reelection of an executive; by allowing him to run for reelection, he will watch how he acts in office so that the people look upon him favorably.[32] These are the aspects which allow for an energetic and stable executive, without which the government as a whole would lack stability and energy.

Lastly, Publius discusses the importance of the Judiciary in the make up of the new Constitution. Publius calls the Federal judiciary, “the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”[33] The purpose of the Federal judiciary he proposes is to prevent “the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”[34] Publius counters the fears of judicial usurpation by asserting that the Federal judiciary will be the weakest of all the branches as it lacks power over the purse and sword. Publius further argues:

Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.[35]

The Judicial branch will have no authority over the purse or over the sword, but instead only over judgment.[36] It will thus be able to prevent against legislative and executive encroachments by striking down laws which are contrary to the Constitution and the laws and treaties of the United States. The separation of the judicial from the legislative is also important so as to allow the judges to exercise their judgment without fear of reprisal by the legislative branch. Thus, the salaries of the judges cannot be lowered so as not to influence their opinions.[37] Their tenure of office also allows for freedom of judgment in judicial matters. Their appointment is for during good behavior, which prevents their judgment from being dependent on reelection, which may have a negative effect on their opinions. Thus through the judicial department is called upon to be safeguard against the encroachments of the representative and executive bodies. It will further only have the power of judgment, not the power of the purse or the sword. And it will further lack dependence on the legislative branch because their salaries cannot be lowered and their tenure of office is during good behavior, not apt to reelection.

The Federalist lays out a discussion of how energy and stability will be present in the new Constitution without violating the principles of republican government and the liberties of the people. As such, the basic necessity to ensure this requires a separation of powers. Publius describes how the various departments of the new government participate and uphold the principles of the separation of powers. He further demonstrates how the people and States partake in the controlling of the new government by their participation in the election of the houses of the legislative. Publius properly upholds his argument in Federalist 37 in his discussion of the following papers.


[1]Federalist 37, in Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter, introduction and notes by Charles R. Kesler (New York: New American Library, Mentor, 1999), 194.

[2] Federalist 37, 195

[3] Federalist 47, 270

[4] Federalist 47, 271

[5] Federalist 48, 277

[6] “as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people…”Federalist 48, 278

[7] “As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power…” Federalist 49, 281-282

[8] Federalist 49, 284

[9] “The members of the legislative department…” Federalist 49, 284

[10] Federalist 50, 285

[11] Federalist 50, 286

[12] “If the periods be distant from each other…” Federalist 50, 286

[13] “Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was, as we have seen….” Federalist 50, 286

[14] Federalist 51, 289

[15] Federalist 51, 289

[16] “But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several…” Federalist 51, 289

[17] Federalist 51, 290

[18] Federalist 51, 290

[19] Federalist 51, 291

[20] Federalist 52, 295

[21] Federalist 52, 298

[22] Federalist 62, 345

[23] Federalist 62, 346

[24] Federalist 62, 347

[25] “The mutability in the public councils…” Federalist 62, 348

[26] Federalist 68, 380

[27] Federalist 68, 382

[28] Federalist 70, 391

[29] Federalist 70, 392

[30] Federalist 70, 392

[31] “Duration in office has been mentioned…”Federalist 71, 399

[32] “The first is necessary to give the officer himself….” Federalist 72, 404

[33] Federalist 78, 433

[34] Federalist 78, 433

[35] Federalist 78, 433

[36] Federalist 78, 433

[37] Federalist 79, 441

Sovereignty by Donation: John Locke’s First Treatise of Government


Quotes taken from the New American Bible
and
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government edited by Peter Laslett

In the previous chapter John Locke discussed Sir Robert Filmer’s assertion that Adam had sovereignty over his children by creation. This next chapter, Locke discusses Filmer’s assertion that Adam had sovereignty by donation from God. There are by two methods Locke discerns from Filmer that Adam would have sovereignty: God gave Adam dominion over all the wild beasts and thereby was monarch, or that he had dominion over all creatures. Locke asserts that God did not give Adam authority over man, or his children and that he did not give him sole dominion over the beasts.

John Locke first examines the claim that Adam had sovereignty by having sole dominion over all living things. The Book of Genesis indicates in the first two chapters the order in which living things were created. On the 6th day God created what can amount to domesticated animals, and He created the wild beasts and reptiles. It is after the creation of the beasts and reptiles, and before the creation of Man, that God says, “Let us make man in our image, in our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, and over all the creatures that move along the ground.” Locke draws specific attention to God’s usage of the word “them” when speaking of man. In normal linguistics this can be noted to say that God was speaking of the plural, and at this point in time the word “man” could be used in reference to either a single person of the male gender or all humans. Thus Locke argues, God gave all man guardianship over the cattle, animals who crawl on the ground, and the wild beasts. Locke also wishes to draw specific attention to note that at verse 28 God does not say to subdue cattle, but rather only those living things that move on the ground. From this Locke points that the Septuagint distinguishes that the living things that move on the ground can be divided into wild beasts and reptiles. Two verses before at 26, Locke points out that God states to create man to rule over creation, in the list provided by Moses of the things man is to have rule over wild beasts are left off.

A certain interesting distinction can be pointed to here, at one point man is given control over the natural and at another only over the political. Wild beasts are the distinction between the natural and political, as according to Aristotle man is either a beast or a god outside of the city. However, the most important aspect to God’s list of what man, or in Filmer’s point of view Adam, is to have dominion over God leaves off man both times. It is clear from this that God intended for man to share in his dominion and rule over the natural life, and is to subdue nature. Of the power granted to man initially, man is not granted the authority to kill. This does not come until Noah and his Sons receive their edict from God to replenish the Earth and eat of animals. The proclamation made to Noah and his Sons can more properly described as a political edict, because at this point man is given authority to kill–something that was left off from the initial proclamation.

Yet still, man does not receive the authority to rule over each other. In Locke’s opinion, if the reader is unable to see that Adam is not sovereign over the world, then they should see it when that same charter is claimed to be given to Noah. Noah does not have children after the flood, only his children do. When God gives His proclamation to Noah, his sons are present as well and receive the same proclamation. That being said, all men are equal after the flood with the same authority. Within this state outside of society, all men are granted dominion over the earth to subdue nature. No one man has authority over another, as Locke points that David in the 8th Psalm does not acknowledge that God granted Adam sovereign authority. By nature we are all equal in our authority.

Likewise, Eve is given the same dominion as Adam because God speaks of man in the plural sense at verse 28. At this point there were only two creatures who fell under the definition of man: Adam and Eve. Clearly, if God spoke in the plural and there were only two humans then both would have be granted the same dominion, not just the one. Eve, as man, has been created similar to Adam, “The man said, ‘This is now bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh…'” (Genesis 2:23.) Eve is an identical copy of Adam, she is fully man just as Adam is fully man. As such, Eve too is created in the Image of God and Locke states, “For wherein sover else the Image of God consisted, the intellectual Nature was certainly a part of it, and belong’d to the whole Species, and enabled them to have Dominion over the inferiour Creatures…” And therefore Adam lacks dominion over all living things, and only over those of the sea, and air and over cattle, wild beasts and reptiles.

Locke has asserted for the first time in a clear and percise manner that all men are created equal and that there is no natural government; man must consent to being ruled and is not naturally born into the precondition of being ruled. Man is not given the authority to take life until after the Flood, when God grants Noah and his children the authority to eat meat and to take the life of one who sheds the blood of man. The idea that man must consent to being governed is shown through England’s Manors. The Lord of the manor only has authority over the natural things, not over his tendents. He can order the slaughter of a calf, but not over those men who inhabit his land. The Lord of a Manor only has the authority granted to him by those who consent to his rule, no more or less. This is a strict departure from Hobbes who grants the Magistrate any authority once one consents to his rule. The only time man is able to refuse the Magistrate is when that Magistrate attempts to take the life of a subject. Locke is specifically stating here that man is given the authority to rule over another man by consent only, and that consent to be ruled is limited to what has been agreed upon.

As such, Locke has now asserted a design for his State of Nature where there is no government except the individual and that all are granted common rule over the earth. He has also demonstrated that man is given command to subdue the earth, which will become the authority to perfect nature in his Second Treatise. All men are created into a world of equal freedom and authority, only when entering into society does man consent to relinguish some of that freedom and authority but never more than what has been agreed upon.

Comments on John Adams letter to Samuel Adams from 18 Oct. 1790


As the American Constitution of 1787 went into effect focus shifted from how to create a new political order to how to preserve it. John Adams, the Second President of the United States, in the autumn of 1790 wrote to his cousin Samuel with his thoughts on how to preserve the American political system. Adams presents three main principles to preserve the American system of government.

The first problem presented by Adams for the new republic was the competing notions of the commerce of luxury and the commerce of economics, called by Adams, “hay, wood and stubble” in reference to Montesquieu. How is it that this government will be able to escape the problem of Europe? Adams suggests that the “prevalence of knowledge and benevolence” are the necessary elements in this endeavor. It is curious that Adams suggests benevolence as a cure for the problem of the commerce of luxury, as benevolence calls to mind piety. For the ancients, piety was one of the main elements needed to moderate the soul. Curiously, Adams is suggesting that piety is necessary in this new republic in order to temper the collective soul of America. Secondly, Adams is calling for a knowledgeable people in America. In fact in his essay Thoughts on Government, Adams calls for liberal education specifically of the lower classes. Once again in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Adams states, “Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties.”[1] Adams places an emphasis on education as a means of preserving liberty. Knowledge and piety, through the manner of benevolence, are necessary for the preservation of the commerce of economics: or prevention against tyranny.

Adams adds a third element for the preservation of this new regime, namely virtue. Adams contrasts knowledge, virtue and benevolence with ignorance, error and vice. He states, “If there were no ignorance, error, or vice, there would be neither principles nor systems of civil or political government.” Of course this hearkens to the Federalist Papers statement, “If men were angels there would be no need for government.” Knowledge, virtue and benevolence must be implemented by the government in order to over come human nature. The best regime to instill these qualities in people and to preserve liberty is discussed next by John Adams.

Republicanism stands as the best method to preserve liberty within the body politic for John Adams. Adams defines republic as, “a government in which the people have collectively, or by representation, an essential share in the sovereignty.” However, Adams does not wish for our country to have a republican form of Poland, Venice, Holland or Bern as he calls them no different, “than the monarchical form in France before the late revolution.” In order to understand what Adams means by this, it is prudent to explain these examples. Poland between 1569 and1795 was a Commonwealth comprised of a single house parliament composed of nobility. Any member of the parliament could abolish it or veto any law it passed. As a fundamental principle, Adams professed that there should be a bi-cameral system of the legislator. Poland violated this principle, making it no better than an absolute monarchy like in France. The Venetian Republic was comprised of an executive and legislative branch of government, with the nobility comprising the legislative assembly. The Venetian Republic was very close to the model of the Roman Republic, which was based on the Commerce of Luxury. Once again, the Venetian Republic violated to the principle of a two house legislator. Holland was a confederate regime with a weak central government and independent states. Once again, the nobility was in charge of government affairs in the Dutch Republic. The system of Bern, which is the capital of Switzerland today, was originally a Dutch style Confederation of independent states. For Adams these regimes lacked the fundamental principles by which a Republic can stand. How Adams envisions the composition of a Republic is left off for later in the letter. Rather, he states, “For, after a fair of trial of its miseries, the simple monarchial for will ever be, as it is has ever been, preferred to it by mankind.” Simply put, republican government is apt to suffer miseries and will eventually dissolve into a simple monarchy. Adams rightly points out that monarchy has always been the preferred method of government by mankind.

In an attempt to explain why it is that monarchy has been preferred over republic, Adams describes the English situation. Adams declares, “They [the English] have succeeded to such a degree, that, with a vast majority of that nation, a republican is as unamiable as a witch, a blasphemer, a rebel, or a tyrant.” Witch and blasphemer are affronts against God, while rebel and tyrant are analogous for affronts against liberty. The most blatant charges against republic is that it produces impious citizens, and that it destroys liberty. For the ancients the regime imitated the divine, and the divine were governed by monarchy: for Christianity the king was divinely ordained by God to rule and so it appears monarchy is the divinely appointed regime. In republics, because it is not the divine regime, the people will tend away from religion and so a good republic will instill a sense of piety within the people.

Secondly, the people are the worst protectors of their own liberty: Thus a regime based on the power of the people would appear as the most unable to protect liberty. How republic can maintain liberty is discussed later by Adams through the implementation of two exterior checks. For now Adams argues that government must cultivate knowledge and benevolence as a method of maintaining liberty and piety within the people. Virtue is a product of knowledge and benevolence and so the republic which instills knowledge and benevolence will produce virtuous citizens. But this is not enough, Adams argues if we wish for the American people not to, “renounce, detest and execrate” the word republic as the English, then there must be “explanations, restrictions and limitations” placed on republic. Adams has provided the explanation of republic and how to combat the problem of the people: Adams is aware that benevolence, virtue and knowledge will not be enough to maintain republican form. Human nature is too powerful to be overcome by these qualities alone, and so needs physical barriers to prevent human nature from destroying liberty.

The first obstacle to self government is human nature, which Adams describes as, “the ocean, its tides and storms.” Adams defines these tides and storms as, “Human appetites, passions, prejudices, and self love.” In order to conquer them, human means are the least helpful. And so religion and education are unable to temper human nature. Religion as Adams states is dependent upon the idea of the Messiah returning and ruling over the world. As this event is still in the future, it cannot be used as the only means against human nature. Universal education, a principle of government for John Adams, is not accepted by the governments of Europe and so knowledge via education cannot depended upon. The people cannot depend on themselves for the preservation of “safety, liberty and security.” Instead the two methods will stand together as “dikes” against “the ocean, its tides and storms” with other natural barriers. These natural barriers were established as a means of preserving liberty.

The first of these barriers Adams wishes to place on society is the development of nobility out of the natural aristocracy. He asserts that “prejudice, passion and private interest” are the roots of the destruction of liberty. These three elements counter public principles, motives and arguments. The nobility when placed without a check has contrived to destroy stability and liberty through summa imperii. However, Adams counters, “So have the plebeians; so have the people; so have kings; so has human nature…” But the nobility, Adams asserts, has also been the greatest protector of liberty. The people and king have only attempted to destroy liberty when given the chance, and so there must be a check on them in the form of the nobility. Adams makes it clear to his cousin that he does not imply to mean hereditary conventional nobility, rather a “natural and actual aristocracy among mankind”: We cannot deny the existence of natural aristocracy. The people, “only serve to foment prejudice, jealousy, envy, animosity, and malevolence. They serve no ends but those of sophistry, fraud and the spirit of party. It would be true, but it would not be more egregiously false, to say that the people have waged everlasting war against the rights of men.” But the nobility, they have been the ones to protect liberty in Europe; it was the noble class who gave England it’s celebrated Magna Carta, not the people nor the king.

Love of liberty according to Samuel Adams “‘is interwoven in the soul of man’”. John takes the opportunity to elaborate on his cousin’s observation. In Jean la Fontaine’s The Wolf and the Lamb, Adams finds that the wolf is a lover of liberty much like man. Together he finds that man and the wolf must be solitary creatures in order to enjoy this love of liberty. Only when man becomes “rational, generous, or social” through enlightenment of “experience, reflection, education, civil, and political institutions” that he can live outside of solitude. The wolf in the story chooses to live alone, lean and hungry because he sees that dogs who live sleek and plump must live under restraint. Like the dog, some men in the past have chosen, “ease, slumber and good cheer to liberty.” The people, as a result, cannot be depended upon alone to preserve liberty: neither can a simple love of liberty within the people be depended upon: The people will quickly forsake their liberty for simple monarchy. So we must introduce political institutions that will fight against tyranny. Yet, in those institutions those without money will always attempt to destroy those with money. In reference back to Aristotle’s Politics, where the democrat fights the oligarch, the poor will desire to destroy the wealthy. But the wealthy will only put up with this for so long when, as in they did in Rome, will tire of the poor. The people and nobility must be checked against each other so as not to allow either to become complacent. For Adams this would be found in a bicameral legislature with one house being for the nobility and the second house for the people. By making the people members of the government, you allow them to be responsible for the preservation of their own liberty. But the people will contrive to destroy that liberty and so the nobility must stand as a vanguard against the destruction of liberty and so they must be placed against the people in the legislature. The people and nobility must stand against each other to prevent either from destroying liberty. The only preservation of liberty is found in a bicameral legislature.

For all the good nobility can and has done for the preservation of liberty, Adams is not blind to how much nobility has contrived to destroy liberty as well. The people according to Adams “pretended to nothing but to be villains, vassals, and retainers to the king or the nobles.” The nobles themselves were not truly free either according to Adams, “because all was determined by a majority of their votes, or by arms, not by law.” This leads to the second problem in the preservation of liberty, family popularity. He asserts that the overthrow of monarchs by the nobility was for little more than to support ambition and family pride. Pride itself is identified as the concomitant of “riches, of knowledge, of genius, of talents, of beauty, of strength, of virtue, and even of piety.” Pride must be brought under check, but Adams rightly points out that family pride would have been nothing if family popularity had not been established. People attach themselves to popular families and as such causes the person to feel a great sense of pride, e.g. the people who attached themselves to the Kennedy family in the 20th century. But this problem according to Adams will always exist, “As long as gratitude or interest, ambition or avarice, love, hope or fear, shall be human motives of action, so long will numbers attach themselves to particular families.” This similar situation existed in ancient Rome, when plebeians would often attach themselves to patrician families in order to serve their ambition to power.

Popularity must be guarded against so as not to allow a single man or family too much power within society to risk the destruction of liberty. The power behind popularity of this kind according to Adams “will be employed to mortify enemies, gratify friends, procure votes, emoluments and power.” Therefore, to check the power of popularity Adams suggests placing “two watches upon them” namely a king and the people. Yet the problem with family popularity is its ability to create factions. Party and mobbish spirits can be traced to popular families. Adams quotes Tarquin, “In nove populo, ubi omnis repentina atque ex virtute nobilitas fit, futurum locum forti ac strenuo viro.” This stands in contrast to the traditional well born of societies where in America the nobility stems from a sudden out growth from the individual virtue. But still Adams fears that popularity of one family will cause other families to become envious. Those who would acquire their position by real merit will be overshadowed by the families: And so how can the family popularity be overcome? The nobles are necessary in society for the preservation of liberty, but the people will become pawns in the ever ambitious attitudes of the nobles.

Adams proposes that there be an arbitrator between the nobles and the people: What this arbitrator might be is not entirely clear. One could suggest that it might be law itself, as Adams points out previously that the nobles are not truly free without law. However, law only protects noble from noble so as not to cause majority tyranny. The King has already been suggested as being placed on the other side of the nobles opposite the people. But we already know from the need of a bicameral legislature that the King cannot properly be this arbitrator. As Adams has already expressed the need for independent legislature and executive, the only branch left is the judicial. To preserve liberty we must have nobility, but that nobility in order to not destroy itself must be restrained by law. The people must be restrained by the nobility, as ought the king. But how are the people to be protected from the nobility except to make them subject to the same law. And by making the people subject to the same law allow for an independent arbitrator to be established to maintain justice and prevent the creation of a conventional aristocracy.

John Adams presents for his cousin Sam and for us readers the need for a defect in society. This defect will serve to cause people to continuously pay attention to the matters of government. The rule of law, bicameral legislature, an executive and independent judiciary are all methods to preserve liberty and together they must promote knowledge, virtue and benevolence within the people. The rule of law will restrict and set free the nobility. A bicameral legislature and executive will place the people, nobility and king against either other and allow none to seize too much power and destroy liberty: The people cannot be trusted to maintain their own liberty and so there must be a nobility. Together the nobility and people will check each other in the bicameral legislature. Because the nobility cannot be trusted, there must be something superior to them and the people to check it’s authority. The executive, or king, is placed above the nobility in the upper house of the legislature and the people are placed in the lower house. Finally the arbitrator between the people and the nobility will be the judicial, who will have the authority to maintain the rule of law. The nobility will naturally attempt to seize power for itself through popularity of families, so in order to prevent this there must be a guardian of the law which was established to free the nobility.


[1] Massachusetts Constitution Part The Second, Chapter V, Section II

Why We Went to War.


 

“But what do we mean by the American Revolution? Do we mean the American war? The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people.”

-John Adams

It might be easy to say that the American Revolution began on that night in 1775 when the British regulars came ashore in Boston headed for weapon caches in Lexington and Concord. To say that the shots fired at Lexington and Concord were the cause the of the American Revolution is to completely ignore the events that lead to that night in 1775. Following the French and Indian War (also know as the 7 Years War to Europeans), the British government determined that they would make the Americans pay for the war that they started. While the British government taxed the American colonists before, following the French and Indian War the involvement of the British government grew to something unseen in the American colonies. In 1765 the British Parliament began efforts to pay off the debts from the war through the Stamp Act. The Stamp Act was a means of taxing the American colonies by requiring all commercial and legal documents to bear a legal stamp. This was the first time the British had ever directly taxed the American colonies. The act, which took effect in November of 1765, met with harsh resistance from the people. It was from this first taxation that the Revolution era saying, “No Taxation without Representation” took hold. The colonists were involved in various forms of resistance including boycotting British made products to destroying the prints where the stamps were made. The Sons of Liberty were the radicals who encouraged the more violent forms of protest that lead to the destruction of the prints. In October of that year the Massachusetts legislature spearheaded an effort to hold an inter-colonial meeting for the first time.

The Stamp Act Congress convened in October of 1765 in New York City. Nine of the thirteen colonies attended the Congress including, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and South Carolina. From this Stamp Act Congress came a letter to King George III, petitions to the British Parliament and the Declaration of Rights and Grievances. Among the points raised in the Declaration of Rights and Grievances are:

1.Only Colonial assemblies have a right to tax the colonies.

2.Trial by Jury was a right, and the use of Admiralty Courts was abusive.

3.Colonists possessed all the rights of Englishmen.

4. Without voting rights, Parliament could not represent the colonists.

Parliament repealed the Stamp Act in March1766 and a year later with they adopted the Townshend Acts, which among other things asserted that Parliament could legislate for the colonies. But by admitting that the British crown in fact had no right to tax the colonies, a right held by the government to do, the Americans were in fact rebelling against British imperial rule over America. The Stamp Act Congress was the first time the colonies came together from all three major regions: New England, Middle, and South. It was in 1765 that the wheels began to turn that caused the colonists to refer to themselves not as Englishmen but as Americans. The American Revolution began the day the colonies met in the Stamp Act Congress.

The American Revolution was not just the war that occurred between 1775 and 1783. The war itself was a product of the Revolution. In the Declaration of Independence the fighting at Lexington and Concord did not even receive direct mention. At the heart of the charges against the King is the fact the British interfered in the running of affairs in North America. Since the establishment of the Royal Colony of Virginia  the colonists had maintained a certain level of self-government without interference from the British. The Stamp Act, a tax, was at the heart of the molestation by the British. The American colonists believed that laws could not be forced upon someone without their consent. Taxation was only permitted if you have the consent of those whom you are taxing. The American Revolution began in October of 1765 when nine of the thirteen colonies formally questioned the authority of the King to rule in America.[5] The American Revolution did in fact begin long before the war itself commenced. It was because of taxation that the people of Boston stored caches of weapons in Lexington and Concord. Sparked byt he Tea Act, it was because of the Boston Tea Part  that caused the British to send troops into Boston. Lexington and Concord were products of the actions taken by the American colonists to prevent illegal taxation by the British. The American Revolution and the War for Independence are two different ideas that encompass each other. The American Revolution was the intellectual developments that occurred beginning in 1765. The War for Independence started off in 1775 in Lexington and Concord and served as the military arm of the Revolution. But as Adams said, the Revolution was already affected in the minds of the people long before the shot heard around the world. The events that took place that night in Lexington and Concord were the climax of a decade’s worth of resistance by the colonies to English taxation.

Footnotes

 [1]It is interesting to note that the Constitution of 1787 required 9 of the 13 colonies to ratify and make it the legal form of government in the United States.

 

Battle in New York: The Question of the Federal Judiciary


 A simple observation of the Federal court system would beg the question whether our courts are a mere mechanism of the giant leviathan of present-day government, or whether the courts have remained unaffected by changes in government. From the fall of 1787 until the spring of 1788 a battle was waged in New York between two factions: the Federalist and the Anti-Federalist. The Federalists were led by the magnanimous Publius and the Anti-Federalists were led by Brutus. Their discussions on the Federal judiciary are the most important carried out between Publius and Brutus. It appears that neither of them had a firm grasp of the Federal judiciary and the possible outcome of the power granted to this branch of government. Two-hundred years after the discussions were held, in America we are left with what appears to be a corruption of the then proposed Federal judiciary as Brutus predicted, but also a Federal judiciary that Publius in many aspects predicted would develop.

            In order to properly evaluate the arguments made by both Publius and Brutus we must begin our observation from the question of the nature and extent of judicial power and whether it poses any threat to the other two branches. We shall also observe the discussion between Brutus and Publius concerning the other matters in which the Federal judiciary holds authority and their relation to the extent of judicial power.

            What is the nature of the power granted to the Federal judiciary by the Constitution of 1787? Article III of the Constitution is a scant three sections long, by far the shortest article of the Constitution that deals with the branches of government. Concerning the direct power granted to the Federal judiciary the Constitution says, “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”[1] Despite the scant manner in which the Constitution outlines the powers granted to the Federal judiciary, Publius and Brutus spend an enormous amount of time devoted to this very question. Publius calls the Federal judiciary, “the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”[2]  The purpose of the Federal judiciary he proposes is to prevent “the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”[3]  One can see that this has been the case on a number of occasions throughout American legal history, most specifically during the New Deal. But for many in the fall of 1787 the ability of the Federal judiciary to prevent these encroachments was further from their minds as to the power of the Federal judiciary. Publius once again counters these fears by asserting that the Federal judiciary will be the weakest of all the branches as it lacks power over the purse and sword. Publius further argues:

Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. [4]

 Brutus attempts to refute this argument made by Publius, asserting that this Federal judiciary will not be a protector and defender of our rights but instead will be just as apt to destroy them as either of the other branches.

            The main authority granted to the Federal judiciary according to Publius and Brutus is the power to strict down laws that are not made in pursuit of the Constitution of the United States. This is the point of contention for Brutus, for he believes that this power alone will give the courts unfettered access to destroy the rights of the people.[5] That the Federal courts will attempt to use their authority to strike down laws to bring it more power is not an unintelligent argument made by Brutus. In fact, it is the better argument made by the two authors. The last half century has seen an attempt by the courts to usurp their constitutionally appointed authority and the authority of both the legislative and executive branches. Brutus also asserts, “This power in the judicial will enable them to mould the government, into almost any shape they please.”[6] Clearly Brutus believes that the meek department of the Federal judiciary argued by Publius is not at all the true nature in which the courts will possess. The notion that the Federal courts will simply attempt to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution and to prevent the encroachment of the legislative power on that of the people held true until the latter half of the twentieth century, when what Brutus predicted came to fruition.

            Next shall be the question of the other powers of the Federal judiciary granted by the Constitution of 1787. Brutus’ main point of contention with these other powers can be summed up in these words, “For, I conceive that the judicial power should be commensurate with the legislative. Or, in other words, the supreme court should have authority to determine questions arising under the laws of the union.”[7] He contends that the Federal judiciary may not have the power to declare what the powers of the legislative branch are, but to merely declare acts of the legislative unconstitutional.[8] When it comes to treaties, Brutus holds that the Federal judiciary may play a role if the treaty in question harms the rights of individual citizens. However to declare the intentions, meaning or nature of the treaty is a power that Brutus wishes not to see in the hands of the Federal judiciary. As Brutus states:

For as treaties will be the law of the land, ever power who have rights or privileges secured by treaty, will have aid of the courts of law, in recovering them. But I do not understand, what is meant by equity arising under a treaty. I presume every right which can be claimed under a treaty, must be claimed by virtue of some article or clause contained in it, which gives the right in plain and obvious words; or at least, I conceive, that the rules for explaining treaties, are so well ascertained, that there is no need of having recourse to an equitable construction. If under this power, the courts are to explain treaties, according to what they conceive their spirit, which is not less than a power to give them whatever extension they may judge proper, it is a dangerous and improper power.[9]

Likewise, Brutus is against the provisions of the Constitution granting jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary to matters stemming from a state and a citizen of another state.[10] Brutus argues, “It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This is humiliating and degrading to a government, and, what I believe, the supreme authority of no state ever submitted to.”[11] This argument by Brutus is horrible; to assert that the source of government’s power ought not to have the authority to reign in it under a court of law is ludicrous. He goes on to argue:

The evil consequences that will flow from the exercise of this power, will best appear by tracing it in its operation. The constitution does not direct the mode in which an individual shall commence a suit against a state or the manner in which the judgement of the court shall be carried into execution, but it gives the legislature full power to pass all laws which shall be proper and necessary for the purpose. And they certainly must make provision for these purposes, or otherwise the power of the judicial will be nugatory. [12]

 Brutus’ argument is not totally unfounded though, as he fears that citizens of one state will attempt to prevent another state from operating properly. Brutus uses the example of the debts owed by the states to their citizens. He believes that the notes given by the states to their citizens can get into the hands of a citizen of another state, allowing for that citizen to take the state to court in order to recoup the money owed them. Long story short, Brutus asserts this will cause the states to go bankrupt and ultimately make them submit to the Federal government.[13]

            Publius on the other hand argues that the authority granted to the Federal judiciary to handle cases in regard to treaties as totally legitimate. He states:

As the denial or the perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of the public faith than to the security of the public tranquility.[14]

 Publius is fearful that a foreign nation will take offense if a citizen of their country is sentenced to serve time in another nation. This would certainly cause a breach of public safety, if that other nation wished to wage war or institute other means of punishing them. The ability of the Federal judiciary to oversee matters concerning cases in which treaties are concerned is certainly a matter that Publius thinks need not be contested. If the commonwealth of Massachusetts were to convict a man from France for a crime, it would fall under the Union as a whole to protect the commonwealth from repercussions by the sovereign nation of France. As to the issue concerning one state and the citizen of another, Publius wholly disagrees with Brutus’ assessment. Publius states, “The power of determining causes between two States, or between one State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different States, is perhaps no less essential to the peace of the Union than that which has been just examined.”[15] If two states were to enter into disagreement over any trivial matter, it could result in a private war between the two states and possibility of a civil war throughout the whole country. For the Federal government to assert itself into matters between two states or between the citizens of one state against another state is for the protection of the peace and public safety of the whole country. Furthermore, Publius argues, “No man ought certainly to be judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”[16] Under this assertion, Publius believes that the Federal judiciary ought to be given authority over such matters as the impartial judge.

            Clearly it can be seen that both Brutus and Publius were passionate about the subject of the Federal judiciary. Neither men make arguments that are clearly accurate, however that at times both men seem to have the better argument over the other. Brutus’ contention is that the power to rule laws unconstitutional may in fact allow for the Federal judiciary to usurp the authority of the other two branches. However, Publius wins the argument when it comes to matters of treaties and matters arising from the various states. It is based on these observations that it cannot be said that the Federal judiciary has become a mechanism for the leviathan of present-day government. But that it has in many ways remained the vision of Publius, as the impartial protector of individual rights against the usurpation of the Federal and state governments, albeit at times it has come dangerously close to losing itself in the leviathan.


[1]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers.
[2]Article III Section II of the U.S. Constitution of 1787.

[3]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #78

 [4]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #78

 [5]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #78

 [6]“From these considerations the judges will be interested to extend the powers of the courts, and to construe the constitution as much as possible, in such a way as to favour it; and that they will do it appears probable.” – Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XI.

[7]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XI

 [8]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

[9]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [10]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [11]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

[12]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution.  Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [13]Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution Brutus’ Essay number XIII

 [14]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #80

 [15]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #80

 [16]Kesler, Charles R., ed. The Federalist Papers. Federalist #80

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